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A classic argument for a fixed exchange rate is its promotion of  trade. Empirical support for this,
however, is mixed. While one branch of research consistently shows a small negative effect of
exchange rate volatility on trade, another, more recent, branch presents evidence of a large positive
impact of currency unions on trade. This paper helps resolve this disconnect. Our results, which use
a new data-based classification of fixed exchange rate regimes, show a large, significant effect of
a fixed exchange rate on bilateral trade between a base country and a country that pegs to it.
Furthermore, the web of fixed exchange rates created when countries link to a common base also
promotes trade, but only when these countries are part of a wider system, as during the Bretton
Woods period. These results suggest an economically relevant role for exchange rate regimes in













I.  Introduction 
Until recently, the idea that a fixed exchange rate promotes trade was both well 
understood and not credible.  Exchange rate policy has been influenced by the argument that 
pegging to, say, the US dollar fosters bilateral trade both with the United States and with all 
other countries that have a dollar peg.  This argument is most compelling for trade with 
countries whose currencies’ values cannot be hedged in forward markets. But, despite the logic 
of this view, and its use in policy debates, the empirical literature fails to present strong 
evidence that a reduction in exchange rate volatility is associated with an increase in trade.
1 
Those uncomfortable with this dissonance between received wisdom and statistical 
results may have taken some comfort by a newer branch of empirical research that uses gravity 
models to study the determinants of bilateral trade.  Some of this research finds a big effect of 
currency unions on trade flows in the modern era.
2 Other work shows that the pre-World War I 
gold standard had an important role in promoting trade, and its demise contributed in an 
important way to the reduction in world trade in the interwar period.
3  
Yet a careful reading of the results from this research employing gravity models is less 
supportive than one might suspect of the policy argument that a country can promote its trade 
by establishing a fixed exchange rate.
4  The regressions on the effects of currency unions on 
trade use a dummy variable representing the presence of a currency union as well as a separate 
variable representing exchange rate volatility.  While the coefficient on the currency union 
dummy variable is large and highly significant, the coefficient on exchange rate volatility tends 
to suggest that the effect of limiting exchange rate volatility, through a means other than the 
establishment of a currency union, is small.
5  Furthermore, results on fixed exchange rates 
                                                 
1 There is a literature in which exchange rate volatility is used as a regressor in import and export equations and, 
generally, the coefficients on exchange rate volatility are either insignificant or small enough to suggest that a 
reduction in exchange rate volatility has a small effect on trade.  See, for example, Cushman (1983, 1986, 1988), 
Gotur (1985), Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978), IMF (1984), Kenen and Rodrik (1986), Klein (1990), and Thursby 
and Thursby (1987). 
2 See, for example, Rose (2000), Rose and Van Wincoop (2001), Glick and Rose (2002), and Frankel and Rose 
(2002). 
3 See Estevadeordal et al. (2003) and Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2004). 
4 Frankel and Wei (1993) used a gravity model that included exchange rate volatility as a regressor, but their 
results suggest a limited role of exchange rate volatility on trade. 
5 Rose (2000) makes a distinction between the effects on trade of a currency union and of a fixed exchange rate, 
and distinguishes between these systems, writing “Sharing a common currency is a much more durable and serious 
commitment than a fixed rate.” (pp. 10 – 11) Tenreyro (2003) writes “…the findings from currency unions do not 
generalize to other regimes with lower variability”.   
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(rather than a currency union) drawn from the gold-standard period may not translate to the 
modern era because bilateral fixed exchange rates at that time were part of a more pervasive 
exchange rate system.  Thus, these considerations, along with results from the earlier literature 
cited above, may raise doubts about the trade effects of a fixed exchange rate in the modern era 
since the empirical results that suggest a large effect of a currency union or the gold standard 
on trade also suggest a minor effect, at best, of limiting exchange rate volatility per se.  
But the feasible policy set may not include the choice of a currency union, nor 
membership in a widespread fixed-exchange rate system, and unilateral dollarization is a 
drastic step.  Rather, the realistic choice facing many policy-makers is whether or not to peg 
their currency to one of the major industrial countries.  The question then arises of the effect of 
this choice on bilateral trade with the country to which they peg, with other countries that also 
peg to the same country, and with countries that do not share a common peg.   
In this paper we address these questions, using a new dataset from Shambaugh (2004) 
that classifies de facto bilateral exchange rate arrangements in the post-Bretton Woods era.  
This data set enables us to create a fixed exchange rate series for use in a gravity model that is 
comparable to the currency union and gold-standard membership series used in research cited 
above.
6  We find a fixed exchange rate between two countries raises the amount of their 
bilateral trade, and that this effect is of the same order of magnitude (though smaller) as a 
currency union or a regional free trade arrangement.  These results are especially relevant for 
policy since they speak to the effects of a policy choice less dramatic than the abandonment of 
the national currency and more attainable than the institution of a widespread fixed exchange 
rate system.  
II.  Methodology  
II.1 Estimation technique 
  The gravity model has been heralded as one of the most successful empirical 
frameworks in international economics.
7  A series of recent papers has augmented the standard 
gravity model to investigate the effect of a range of variables on bilateral trade, including 
                                                 
6 We also include exchange rate volatility as a regressor to ensure that fixed rates are not simply picking up the 
effect of reducing overall macroeconomic volatility.  As will be shown, our core results are robust to the use of 
another de facto exchange rate classification scheme, the one developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
7 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) begin their article with the statement “The gravity equation is one of the most 
empirically successful in economics.” (p. 170)  Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985) provide early theoretical 
justifications for the gravity model.    3
membership in a currency union.  We adopt this technique by regressing bilateral trade on a 
standard set of gravity model variables, as well as dummy variables that indicate whether two 
countries have a direct or indirect fixed exchange rate, a dummy variable that indicates whether 
one country has formed a currency union with its trading partner, and a variable representing 
the volatility of the exchange rate between the trading partners.    Each observation in the 
regressions we run represents, for a particular year, a dyad, that is, a country-pair observation.  
The specification of the core regressions takes the form 
(1)  t j i t j i t j i t j i t j i t j i j i t j i t j i v v CU F F Z X T , ,
2
, , 5 , , 4 , , 3 , , , 2 2 , , , 1 1 , 2 , , 1 , , ) ln( ε β β β β β α α + + + + + + + =  
where ln(Ti,j,t) is the natural logarithm of trade between countries i and j in year t,  t j i X , ,  
represents a set of variables that vary over time, such as the product of the natural logarithm of 
income of countries i and j at time t,   j i Z ,  represents a set of variables that do not vary over 
time, such as the natural logarithm of the distance between countries i and j,   t j i F , , , 1  is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if there was a fixed exchange rate (but not a currency union) between the 
two countries at time t,  t j i F , , , 2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there was an indirect peg 
(discussed below),  t j i CU , ,  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if one of the countries had a currency 
union with the other at time t,  t j i v , ,  is a measure of volatility of the exchange rate between 
countries i and j at time t, and  t j i , , ε  is an error term.
8  Other specifications add additional 
exchange rate regime variables discussed below. 
  This specification differs from the one used in research that considers the effect of a 
currency union on bilateral trade only by the inclusion of the terms  t j i F , , 1 1 β and t j i F , , 2 2 β .  This, 
however, marks an important distinction between the manner in which we estimate the effect of 
                                                 
8 The actual set of variables that constitute  t j i X , ,  used in the regressions in this paper include the product of the 
natural logarithm of income of countries i and j in period t, the product of the natural logarithm of income per 
capita of countries i and j in period t, a dummy variable indicating whether the two countries had a free trade 
agreement at time t, and another a dummy variable indicating whether one country was a colony of the other 
country at time t. The variables used in the regressions that do not vary over time, represented by  j i Z ,  in (1), 
include the natural logarithm of the distance between countries i and j, the product of the natural logarithm of the 
land areas of countries i and j, dummy variables representing whether or not countries i and j share a common 
border or share a common language, and other dummy variables indicating whether one country had been a colony 
of the other, whether either country is landlocked, whether either country is an island, whether both countries had a 
common colonizer, and whether one of the countries was, at one time, a dependency, territory or colony of the 
other.    4
a fixed exchange rate on trade and the manner in which that effect has been estimated both in 
the context of gravity models as well as in the older literature that estimates import or export 
equations.  In both of those cases, the estimated effect of a fixed exchange rate on trade is 
calculated by multiplying the estimated coefficients on the exchange rate volatility terms,  4 β  
and  5 β  in specification (1), by a given change in exchange rate volatility and exchange rate 
volatility squared, respectively.  Results obtained in this fashion suggest only a minor effect of 
a fixed exchange rate on trade.   
In contrast, the estimated effect of a currency union on trade from a gravity model, 
calculated as  () 1 exp 3 − β  in a specification like that in (1), is reported as very large (as much as 
tripling trade, ceteris paribus) and highly statistically significant.
9 Quah (2000), in his comment 
on the original Rose (2000) paper, notes that this implies a large discontinuity in the effects on 
trade of restricting exchange rate volatility.  In this paper, we estimate the effect of a fixed 
exchange rate on trade as  () 1 exp 1 − β , in a manner completely analogous to way that the 
coefficient on the currency union dummy variable has been interpreted in gravity models that 
investigate that issue.  This method recognizes reducing volatility from, say, 5% to zero may be 
qualitatively different than a reduction in volatility from 20% to 15%, even when allowing for 
non-linearities in the relationship between exchange rate volatility and trade.  In fact, we find 
the response of trade to a fixed exchange rate to be much closer to, and in many cases 
statistically indistinguishable from, its response to a currency union.
10  Fixed rates may have an 
effect beyond that of volatility for a number of reasons, most notably, the certainty a peg 
generates.  Most fluctuations in volatility are not known to participants ahead of time, so even 
if a pair of countries has low volatility in a given year, this probably does not increase trade 
while a fixed rate provides a certainty which may be helpful in forming trading relationships. 
  One concern with the estimates from an equation like (1) is that, despite the plethora of 
controls included in the gravity model, there may be omitted variables that affect bilateral trade.  
                                                 
9 For example, Frankel and Rose (2002) present an estimated coefficient on the currency union dummy variable of 
1.38 with an associated standard error of 0.19 (see their Table 1) which implies that membership in a currency 
union triples bilateral trade, ceteris paribus, since e
1.38 – 1 = 2.97.   
10 The partial derivative of trade with respect to either a fixed exchange rate or a currency union could  include 
both the direct effect,  ( ) 1 1 exp − β  or  ( ) 1 3 exp − β , respectively, and the separately estimated effect of a reduction 
in exchange rate volatility, involving the coefficients  4 β  and  5 β .  In practice, however, the estimated effect of 
exchange rate volatility on trade is small and we only refer to the estimated direct effects.    5
Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) show that omitting a variable that reflects each country’s 
(time-invariant) resistance to international trade leads to an inflation of the estimated effect of 
the reduction of trade due to national borders.  A solution to the presence of such “multilateral 
resistance” is to include country fixed effects (CFE) when estimating the gravity model.  As 
predicted by their theory, the empirical results presented in their paper demonstrate that the 
estimated effect of a border is significantly reduced when CFE are included.  Following this 
insight, we present CFE estimates in this paper in which we effectively include about 140 
dummy variables in the regression, one for each country, and any observation will have each of 
the two dummy variables representing the countries in its trade dyad equal to 1 while all the 
other country dummy variables will equal 0. 
In the context of the issue we study, however, the CFE estimation approach may fail to 
provide estimates that enable us to make a policy-relevant argument on the likely bilateral trade 
consequences of a fixed exchange rate. The problem is that unobserved variables could be 
correlated with both the error term of a gravity model and the likelihood that two countries 
have a fixed exchange rate.
 11   In this case, the estimated effect of fixed exchange rates on trade 
will be too large when using CFE estimation.  Recognizing this, Rose and Glick (2002) argue 
for using country-pair fixed effects (CPFE) estimation, rather than OLS or CFE estimation.  
The CPFE estimates effectively include a dummy variable for each of the roughly 10,000 
country pairs in the data set.  Thus, any particularly strong bilateral tendency to trade is 
captured in the fixed effect and statistical identification comes after controlling for the average 
level of trade for a given pair. This can be seen as a generalization of the Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) approach by assuming bilateral resistance to trade at the country-pair level, 
rather than the multilateral resistance to trade at the country level.  Thus, while presenting CFE 
estimates, we focus our discussion on the estimates we obtain from gravity models that include 
CPFE. 
A first glance at the tables of results using CPFE estimation may be disconcerting since 
this method does not offer estimates of the effect of variables that do not vary over the sample 
period (e.g. distance), and, therefore, the “gravity” (as represented by the distance term) 
disappears from the gravity model when it is estimated using CPFE estimation.  In fact, the 
                                                 
11 On a related note, Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) show that the estimated effect of trade blocs on trade is 
overstated when one does not control for the fact that, even before these trade blocs were instituted, there was 
significantly more trade between countries in a trade bloc in the inter-war period.   6
impact of distance is still in the regression, but it is captured by the fixed effect.
12 The more 
significant aspect of this issue for our paper is that any country pair that has a fixed exchange 
rate for the entire sample period will not yield information in the estimate of the impact of a 
fixed exchange rate on trade.  Rather, CPFE estimates identify the effect of fixed exchange rate 
on trade only from those country pairs that switch exchange rate status during the sample 
period.  But, as it turns out, most fixed exchange rate regimes do not last for the entire sample, 
so we lose information from relatively few country pairs when we use CPFE estimation rather 
than CFE estimation.    
Section II.2a:  Exchange Rate Regime Classifications 
The methodology outlined above differs from previous research studying the effect of 
fixed exchange rates on trade primarily through the variable used to assess the presence of a 
fixed exchange rate.  As mentioned, our contribution is distinguished by its use of a dummy 
variable representing the presence of a fixed exchange rate between two countries.  In this 
section we discuss the exchange rate classification scheme used in this paper and present some 
statistics on the number of fixed exchange rates as well as the characteristics of countries that 
peg their currencies.
13   
The de facto classification scheme described here, and used in our first set of results, is 
drawn from Shambaugh (2004) and is based on the behavior of countries’ official exchange 
rates.  A particular country is judged to have a direct peg with a certain base country in a given 
year if their bilateral exchange rate stays within a +/- 2 percent band.
14  In addition, if a country 
maintains a perfectly flat peg to the currency of a base country for 11 out of 12 months within a 
year, but then has a single change in its bilateral exchange rate, this “single change” 
observation is also coded as a direct peg .  The logic in this case is that the currency of the 
country is pegged for the entire year but, at some point in that year, there is a realignment to a 
                                                 
12 As Quah (2000) notes, the entire gravity model is in a sense a large nuisance parameter in projects of this kind 
as we are trying to estimate an effect that is not theoretically embedded in the gravity model, and are simply using 
the gravity model to generate our controls.   
13 To test the robustness of these results, we also employ the de facto exchange rate classification scheme from 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and the de jure regime classification scheme based on information published by the 
IMF in its Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.  These alternative classification 
schemes are discussed in more detail below in the section that presents results using them. Shambaugh (2004) 
provides more extensive commentary on different choices of exchange rate regime classifications. 
14 We have a separate category for currency unions and, therefore, there is no overlap between those dyads that are 
classified as having a currency union in a particular year and any dyad classified as having a fixed exchange rate in 
that year.    7
new peg.
15  Finally, exchange rates that are maintained within a +/- 2 percent band for only one 
year are not coded as a direct peg since a single year of stable exchange rates may be a random 
lack of volatility rather than a policy-driven peg.  It is reasonable to think that the market 
responses to these single year pegs are distinct from those to longer-lived pegs.  
A crucial aspect of this classification scheme is the identification of a base country.  
Base countries may include those that have a major currency, such as the United States, France, 
the United Kingdom, or Germany, as well as those that are important within a given region, 
such as India or Australia.  Base countries can often be determined by reference to the official 
declarations, or by historical relationships. In addition to the countries already mentioned, 
Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Italy, New Zealand, South Africa, India, and Malaysia are all bases 
at some point in time.
16  
Countries engaged in a direct peg with a base will also be involved in a number of 
indirect pegs with other countries.  The range of indirect pegs is illustrated in Figure 1.  The 
“family tree” mapped in this figure shows that two countries pegged to the same base will also 
be pegged to one another in a “sibling” relationship.  For example, India and South Africa had 
this type of indirect peg when both were pegged to the US dollar.  Another type of indirect peg 
is a “grandchild” relationship that exists between a base country, such as the United States, and 
another country pegged to a country that is itself pegged to the base.  Bhutan had this type of 
exchange rate relationship with the United States during those years that its currency was 
pegged to the Indian rupee and the rupee was pegged to the dollar.  In this case, there is also the 
indirect “aunt/uncle” relationship between Bhutan and South Africa , and the indirect “cousin” 
relationship between Bhutan and Lesotho, whose currency was pegged to the South African 
rand.  In our regressions, we include an indirect peg dummy variable that equals 1 for a dyad 
that has any of the family of indirect pegs described in this paragraph along with a separate 
dummy variable that represents direct pegs.  Currency unions, direct pegs, and indirect pegs are 
                                                 
15 See Shambaugh (2004) for more discussion.  Changing the definition of bands from +/- 2% to +/- 1% had little 
effect on the number of observations coded as pegs.  “Single change” pegs represent a small fraction of total pegs. 
16 The biggest challenge in choosing a base country comes when considering the Bretton Woods era since most 
potential base countries were pegged to the US dollar.  We rely on the few revaluations and devaluations that 
occurred during the Bretton Woods period, as well as the small variations in exchange rates during that time, to 
identify base countries.  For example, a country that devalued against the dollar at the same time as the British 
pound in 1967 is judged as having Britain as its base country.  A country would also be judged as having Britain as 
its base if it maintained a strict peg with the pound sterling while exhibiting some fluctuation with the United 
States dollar .   8
all mutually exclusive.  Observations can only be coded as one type of exchange rate regime.  
While currency union observations naturally generate direct pegs or indirect pegs in the coding 
due to their stable exchange rates, those observations are only considered currency unions, not 
pegs. 
Table 1 presents some statistics on the number of direct pegs, the number of indirect 
pegs, and the number of currency unions in the data set we use.  This data set is based on 
information on 181 countries over the period 1973 – 1999, yielding 4381 country-year 
observations (rather than 181 × 27 = 4887 because some countries, like Estonia, did not exist 
for the entire sample period)  As indicated in the second row of Table 1, there are 11,805 
separate country pairs (rather than (181 × 180)/2 = 16,290 because of missing observations) 
and, over the 27 years of the sample, there are 168,868 observations.  The third row of Table 1 
shows that there are 1562 direct pegs in this sample, and 90 percent of these observations are 
industrial country / developing country dyads.
17  Given the fact that most countries 
contemplating pegging are developing countries considering pegging to an industrial base, it is 
useful that most of the data used to generate our results comes from that type of relationship. 
We also note that while the overall number of direct pegs may seem small in relation to the 
total number of observations, the number of direct pegs in a bilateral trade data set will 
necessarily be a small proportion of the number of overall observations since any country can 
have a direct peg with only one other country while it can trade with as many as 100 other 
countries.  The relevant statistics regarding the frequency of pegs, therefore, are that roughly 
half the 4381 country year observations are coded as pegs, even in the post Bretton Woods era, 
and 135 countries are involved in a peg at some point.  The fact that almost 50 percent of the 
countries peg at any one time helps explain why there are 13,679 indirect peg observations, as 
indicated in the third panel of Table 1, since any direct peg can create a large number of 
indirect pegs,    
The bottom panel of Table 1 indicates that 2005 observations include a currency union 
in the post-1972 sample.  This number is not directly comparable to the number of observations 
with either a direct peg or an indirect peg since it includes all intertwining relationships within 
a multilateral currency union (e.g. among the countries in the CFA), but not dyads in which two 
                                                 
17 Industrial countries are defined as those countries with an IFS number under 199 with the exception of Turkey.  
This includes the US, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Western European nations.   9
countries have both, unilaterally, adopted the currency of a third country (e.g. the dyad of 
Panama and Liberia would not be coded as a currency union, even when both had a currency 
union with the United States).  As shown in the table, 88 percent of these currency union 
observations are dyads between two developing countries.   
As noted above, CPFE estimation identifies coefficients on direct pegs, indirect pegs, 
and currency unions from country pairs that switch regimes during the sample period.  Of the 
144 country pairs that ever have a direct peg from 1973-1999, 118 show a change in regime 
with 56 of these switching once, 25 switching twice (that is, both on and off a peg), and 37 
switching more than twice. Thus, we are not simply identifying off a single break in most 
cases, but a more rich history of regime transitions.  The multiple switches per pair result in a 
total of 257 switches over the period, comprised of 141 switches off of a peg and 116 switches 
onto a peg. 
18 
Section II.2b:  Pegged Country Characteristics 
Statistics on the ratio of average trade between dyads with pegs or currency unions to 
the average trade for all dyads are also presented in Table 1.
19  Trade of direct peg dyads is 
1,253 percent of average trade.  Thus, while dyads with a fixed exchange rate are a relatively 
small proportion of all dyads, they comprise a meaningful portion of the volume of world trade.  
Direct peg dyads account for 11% of average annual world trade in the post-Bretton Woods 
period, with a range of 7 percent to 19% percent of trade in these years (the maximum value 
during the Bretton Woods era was 33% of world trade).  This reflects the fact that a typical 
direct trade dyad includes one large, industrial country and that base country is ten times the 
size of the average country (and six times the size of the average industrial country) in a given 
year.  The non-base country in a direct peg dyad is, on average, about 30 percent the size of the 
                                                 
18 2673 country pair have an indirect peg at some time during the sample, and 146 country pairs are engaged in a 
currency union at some time during the sample.  2357 dyads switch indirect peg status and this relatively high 
proportion of switches to indirect pegs, as compared to the case with direct pegs, reflects the fact that when a 
country changes from non-pegged to a peg, it triggers one regime switch for a direct peg, but it often creates many 
indirect peg switches.  62 country pairs switch currency union status in the post-Bretton Woods era, and all of 
these switch only once, with 42 of these observations representing the dissolution of a currency union and 20 
representing the establishment of a currency union.  Because of the intertwining relationships in currency unions, 
not all of these switches represent independent events, unlike the case with direct pegs.  For example, 10 of the 
creations come from Mali joining the CFA and thus creating a currency union with each existing member.  
19 Results are based on taking the average size of base countries divided by the average size of all countries by 
year and then averaging those results across years.  This procedure gives equal weight to information from all 
years regardless of the number of pegs in a given year, but it also removes any problems associated with changes 
in the number of pegs over time as countries have grown richer.   10
average country, with pegged (non-base) industrial countries about 40 percent the size of all 
industrial countries and pegged developing countries about half the size of other developing 
countries    
We have already noted the relative preponderance of direct peg observations among 
dyads that include an industrial country and a developing country and the policy relevance of 
focusing on the possible trade-creating effects for this subsample of the data.  Table 1 indicates 
that this subsample already represents a significant proportion of world trade.  The statistics in 
the first panel of this table show that trade between industrial and developing countries 
accounts for 38 percent of overall annual trade in the post-Bretton Wood era.
20  Thus, the 
policy option we study is one that is frequently used and involves a meaningful portion of 
world trade.
21   
 
III. Results: 
III.1:  Core Results 
The statistic cited above, that the average dyad with a fixed exchange rate trades ten 
times more than the average dyad without a fixed exchange rate, is striking.  But this 
unconditional statistic can only suggest a role for fixed exchange rates in influencing trade.  
Compelling evidence must control for a range of determinants of bilateral trade.  In this section, 
we use the gravity model to determine the effect of fixed exchange rates on trade, conditional 
on the role of other factors.  As will be shown, results from estimating gravity models imply 
that fixed exchange rates have a statistically significant and economically important role in 
influencing trade.    
Most of the results presented in this section are based on a sample of annual data from 
the post Bretton Woods period of 1973 to 1999.
 22  We focus on this period because we are 
                                                 
20 That percentage is the same if the sample is restricted to be rectangular and is 32% if trade involving “oil 
exporters” (as defined by the World Bank) is dropped. 
21 These results concerning the amount of trade represented by direct peg dyads contrast with the amount of trade 
represented by currency union dyads.  The majority of currency unions observations consist of dyads with two 
developing countries.  Consequently, the average amount of trade for these dyads is only 35 percent of the average 
trade for all dyads.  Moreover, developing countries in currency unions are typically only 10% the size of a typical 
developing country in the post Bretton Woods sample. 
22 The exchange rate classification data comes from Shambaugh (2004).  His post-Bretton Woods data was 
extended to the 1960-72 period for this paper.  The exchange rate volatility data is the standard deviation of the 
monthly percentage change in the bilateral exchange rate; this is calculated using IMF exchange rate data (period   11
interested in relevant policy lessons for the present day, when the decision to peg a currency is, 
in most cases, a unilateral choice concerning a single bilateral relationship.  In contrast, a 
country that pegged its currency to the dollar during the Bretton Woods era necessarily chose 
membership in a wide, multilateral system of pegged rates.  Such a system neither exists today 
nor is likely to be instituted in the foreseeable future.  However, results presented towards the 
end of this section draw on the experience of the Bretton Woods era in order to consider the 
possibility of systemic effects of a fixed exchange rate. 
The first set of results is presented in Table 2.  The differences in the three sets of 
estimates presented in this table highlight the sensitivity of results to the inclusion of country-
level fixed effects (CFE) and country-pair-level fixed effects (CPFE).  As mentioned in Section 
II, OLS estimation, like that presented in Column 1 of Table 2, may misstate the true effect of 
fixed exchange rates on trade due to the presence of omitted variables.  This omission can be 
corrected by country-level fixed effects if one assumes multilateral resistance to trade, as is 
done by Anderson and van Wincoop (2001).  In fact, the coefficient on the direct peg variable 
is about half as big in the country-fixed effects estimate (Column 2) as in the OLS estimate 
(Column 1).  The alternative assumption, of bilateral resistance to trade, demands country-pair 
fixed effects, rather than country-level fixed effects, as discussed in Section II.  This estimate is 
the one that most thoroughly isolates the fixed-exchange rate effect from other, unobserved, 
effects that may contribute to trade between two countries and may also be positively correlated 
with the likelihood of those countries having a fixed exchange rate.  Accordingly, the  estimate 
of the coefficient on the direct peg dummy variable in Column 3 is one-third the value of the 
OLS estimate and two-fifths the value of the CFE estimate, but it is statistically significantly 
different from zero at better than the 95 percent level of confidence.
23   
                                                                                                                                                           
end).  We gratefully acknowledge that the trade data, gravity regressors, and currency union dummies from Rose 
(2004) were made available on Rose’s website. 
23 The standard errors reported in the regressions are clustered at the country pair level.  This both allows for 
different variance across the pairs and, more importantly, for an unstructured covariance within the clusters 
allowing for correlation across time.  Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) suggest clustering as the 
appropriate way to handle autocorrelation in panel differences-in-differences estimation techniques.  They note 
that clustering in this manner is similar to a Newey-West setup but allows all lags to be potentially important.  
They also argue that clustering outperforms parametric corrections to the autocorrelation (such as AR(1) models) 
in simulations.  Kezdi (2002) makes a number of similar points in a more general panel fixed effects setup, and 
again strongly recommends clustering as the appropriate correction.  When country-pair fixed effects are not 
included, it seems quite clear that the level at which one should cluster is the country pair, as the country pair 
means are still in the error and require correction.  On the other hand, once these means have been removed with 
the dummies, it is less clear whether clustering should be at the country pair level or a more general level.  We   12
The estimates of the effect of a fixed exchange rate on trade that are presented in Table 
2 are economically meaningful, as well as statistically significant.  The coefficient on the direct 
peg in Column 1, estimated with OLS, implies an 80% increase in trade for country pairs that 
have a fixed exchange rate compared to those that do not.
24  This result holds despite the fact 
that we control for exchange rate volatility in addition to all the standard gravity controls.
25  
The CFE estimate (which also includes fixed year effects) of the coefficient is 0.32 (an impact 
of 38%), and, the CPFE estimate of 0.19 implies a 21% increase in trade.  These effects are 
broadly comparable to (and statistically indistinguishable from) the estimated effects of 
currency unions when one uses country-pair fixed effects to control for bilateral trade 
resistance.
26  For example, the CPFE estimates suggest a pair of countries in a currency union 
trade 38 percent more than an otherwise similar pair; but the confidence intervals for the fixed 
exchange rate and the currency union coefficients clearly overlap (we can only reject that they 
are different at the 60 percent level of confidence).
27  The indirect pegs are statistically 
insignificant in this sample once CFE or CPFE are introduced.   
One interpretation of these results is that 11 percent of world trade (the proportion in the 
sample that includes trade between countries with a direct peg) would be reduced by 20 percent 
(using the most conservative, but also most convincing, CPFE estimate) if countries were to 
                                                                                                                                                           
cannot cluster at the country level as two countries appear in each observation.  Therefore, we have experimented 
with clustering on the larger country in the pair (so all US pairs would be in one cluster, etc.) and also separately 
clustering on the smaller country.  The small country clusters produce standard errors quite similar to country pair 
clusters.  Often, though, big country clustering yields smaller standard errors than those reported implying some 
negative correlation across the individual country pair clusters.  In theory, given that this correlation exists, we 
should cluster at that level in the CPFE regressions, but we take the more conservative approach and report the 
larger country pair cluster standard errors and simply note where the clustering technique affects the interpretation 
of the results.  We also note that other approaches: uncorrected standard errors, heteroskedasticity consistent 
standard errors, or Newey West standard errors are always smaller (with the Newey West standard errors 
approaching those reported as we increase the lags included), and thus our choice has made significant results less 
likely.   
24 Trade is 1.8 times higher for country pairs with fixed rates (80% larger) because e
0.59 =1.80. 
25 As would be expected from previous studies, the impact of exchange rate volatility is low over the various 
specifications in Table 1.   Reducing exchange rate volatility from the mean to zero suggests only a -1 to -2% 
impact on trade.  Removing the exchange rate volatility measure slightly increases the coefficients on all exchange 
rate regime variables.  The volatility used is nominal because this is consistent with looking at a fixed nominal 
exchange rate.  We use official rates because, again, this is consistent with the way the exchange rate regime 
variables are generated. 
26 But, as noted above, the currency union dummy variable is not strictly comparable to the direct peg dummy 
variable. See Levy-Yeyati (2003) for differences across types of currency unions. 
27 It is important to note the impact of the number of country pairs that switch regimes over a particular time 
period when using country pair fixed effects.  Glick and Rose’s (2002) results which first explored the impact of 
currency unions using country pair fixed effects had a longer time series and show 146 switches.  In the post-1972 
era, there are only 62 country pairs that have a regime switch for currency unions.  Thus, we are leery of viewing 
our results as retesting the currency union effect, it is included more as a control than a test variable.     13
abandon pegged exchange rates.  This might reduce trade by 2 – 3 percent.  But this calculation 
obviously masks the effects across different countries.  In particular, it understates the extent to 
which trade between industrial and developing countries, which represents approximately 40 
percent of world trade, could be affected by a change in the pattern of fixed exchange rates 
since the bulk of our fixed rate observations occur in industrial / developing country dyads. 
We are also interested in whether these results are widely applicable across groups of 
countries.  We address this question in Table 3 which presents CPFE estimates (in columns 1 – 
3) and CFE estimates (in Columns 4 – 6) of the effect of fixed exchange rates, and currency 
unions, on bilateral trade between industrial countries and developing countries, as well as 
bilateral trade among industrial countries and bilateral trade among developing countries.   
The country fixed effects regressions show that the effect of direct pegs seems to be 
coming from the industrial and developing pairs.  Looking at the CPFE regressions (columns 1-
3), we see that none of the groups yield a significant coefficient.  By splitting the sample, we 
have reduced the number of pairs that switch regimes in any given sample.  Thus, there is very 
little data to identify industrial-industrial or developing-developing pairs, making effects 
difficult to estimate.
 28  For the industrial-developing sample, we note that any other form of 
clustering generates a significant result in column 2.  The CPFE results indicate that a direct 
peg raises trade between an industrial country and a developing country by 15 percent, ceteris 
paribus, while the CFE result, which does not control for unobserved pair-specific factors, 
indicates an increase in trade of 50 percent.  These results suggest that the significant effects 
presented for the full sample in Table 2 reflect the effect of trade between industrial and 
developing countries.  The results in Table 3 are distinguished from those in the preceding table 
in that an indirect peg has a significant and positive effect on trade between industrial countries, 
when controlling for country pair fixed effects (Column 1) and between industrial and 
developing countries, when controlling for country fixed effects (Column 5).  Finally, we also 
note that the significant role that currency unions play in promoting trade that is evident from 
                                                 
28 As shown in Table 1, there are 102 switches among the industrial – developing dyads, but only 14 among the 
industrial – industrial dyads and 2 among the developing – developing dyads.  The situation with currency unions 
differs in that there are 52 currency union switches among the dyads including two developing countries, but only 
9 among those representing industrial –developing dyads and 1 among the industrial – industrial dyads.   14
the results in Table 2 seems to arise as a result of bilateral trade among developing  countries 
(Columns 3 and 6).
29  
Section III.2  Potential Diversion and System Effects 
It is conceivable that the effect of a fixed exchange rate between two countries on the 
level of their bilateral trade depends upon the broader environment in which that policy choice 
is made.  In particular, one might suspect that there is a bigger effect of an indirectly fixed 
bilateral exchange rate on trade, due to its credibility or perceived permanence, when that 
indirect peg is part of a broader web of fixed exchange rates, such as during the Bretton Woods 
period or within the European Monetary System of the 1980s and 1990s.  This suspicion is 
fostered by previous work on the Gold Standard that shows how that exchange rate system 
promoted world trade (Taylor et al., 2003).   We investigate the possibility of systemic effects 
of fixed exchange rates on trade in Table 4 by including, along with country-pair fixed effects 
and the regressors described above, interaction terms that are the product of a systems dummy 
variable and the indirect peg dummy variables.  The system dummy variable equals 1 for 
observations in which the two countries are both members of the Bretton Woods system (for 
the period 1960 to 1970) or, in the post-Bretton Woods era, if both countries in a dyad with a 
pegged exchange rate are in Western Europe.
30    
Another consideration is that the overall trade-promoting effects of a peg could be 
mitigated if it simply redirects trade towards the base country and away from other countries.  
In Table 4 we consider possible trade diversion effects by examining the role of unlinked pegs. 
A dummy variable representing an unlinked peg is set to 1 if one, but not both, of the countries 
in the dyad has a fixed exchange rate with another country, or if both countries have fixed 
exchange rates but there is no indirect peg between them.
31  There are over 90,000 observations 
for which this dummy variable is equal to 1, a statistic that illustrates the potential economic 
relevance of this effect.  We also test whether diversion effects are more pronounced when one 
                                                 
29 Recently, some studies have taken preliminary looks at the progress of trade under EMU, providing evidence on 
industrial / industrial trading pairs in currency unions.  Micco et al  (2003) find an impact of roughly 10%. 
30 We include all Western European post Bretton Woods countries as part of this “system” even though this 
includes a variety of systems (the Snake, early EMS, late EMS) and includes countries such as Austria which were 
not formal members at all times, but shadowed these systems. 
31 For example, the pair India / Japan is marked an “unlinked peg” when India pegs to the US and Japan is not 
pegged.  Also, the pair India / France is an unlinked peg when India pegs to the US and France to Germany.   15
a peg is part of a larger system by including, in the regression, the interaction between the 
system variable and the unlinked peg variable.
32  
The first column of Table 4 presents a CPFE estimate that is comparable to the one in 
Column 3 of Table 2, in that it includes the same sample period, but the estimate in Table 4 
includes three new regressors; the interaction term between the system dummy variable and the 
indirect peg dummy variable, an unlinked peg dummy variable, and the interaction of the 
unlinked peg dummy variable and the system dummy variable.  Among the coefficients on 
these new regressors, only the one on unlinked peg is significant, and it is positive, indicating 
that countries that have a fixed exchange rate trade more, even with countries to which they are 
not pegged. Thus, rather than diverting trade away from other trading partners, pegging 
significantly increases trade with the both the base country by 23 percent (the coefficient on the 
direct peg dummy variable of 0.205 is significant) and other countries not pegged to the same 
base by 5 percent.
33  Given the large number of dyads for which unlinked peg equals 1, as 
compared to the number for which the direct peg dummy variable equals 1, this result on 
unlinked peg is nearly as economically important to the level of world trade as the larger 
coefficient on direct peg.
34   
The second column of Table 4 demonstrates the sensitivity of the results presented in 
Column 2 to an extension of the sample period to include the Bretton Woods era.  Comparing 
the results in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 shows that the addition of the observations from the 
Bretton Woods period has little impact on the coefficient on the direct peg variable.
35  But these 
additional observations result in a significant and relatively large effect of indirect pegs within 
a system of fixed exchange rates, with an estimated effect of an increase in trade of 29 percent.  
                                                 
32 We do not include an interaction between the direct peg dummy variable and the system dummy variables since 
we think system effects would be manifested in the effects of indirect pegs and diversion.  In fact, the coefficient 
on the interaction between the direct peg dummy variable and the system dummy variable (in an estimate not 
reported here) is not significant. 
33 Rose (2000) also explores diversion and also finds that potentially diverted pairs show more trade not less. 
34 The unlinked peg observations represent 28% of world trade, and, therefore, increasing that portion by 5% could 
increase trade 1-2%.  Added to the direct peg impact, the total impact on trade flows is as much as 5%. 
35 A number of caveats about the pegged exchange rate data for this pre-1973 period should be acknowledged.  
Pegging is pervasive in the Bretton Woods era, with 90% of the observations classified as direct pegs, indirect 
pegs, or currency unions.  This leaves few excluded observations to separately identify the time dummies that are 
also included and, therefore, the time dummies themselves may proxy for the system effects.  We also note that if 
one does not include controls for the Bretton Woods system effects the time dummies increase in value during the 
Bretton Woods time period making the direct peg observations of that era appear weaker and lowering the 
coefficient on direct peg   16
The positive unlinked peg effect is also significant within a system of fixed exchange rates, 
with an estimated effect of an increase in trade of 9.6 percent.
36   
We may suspect that there are a number of important differences between the Bretton 
Woods era and more recent times that result in instability across these periods in the value of 
coefficients in the gravity model.  For example, the changing role of developing countries in 
the world economy, changes in the relative price of commodities, and a change in policy 
towards a more outward orientation could all alter the results  The CPFE estimates presented in 
the third column of Table 4 allows us to consider this possibility by presenting results that 
allow for different effects of GDP and GDP per capita in the Bretton Woods era as compared to 
the later period.
37  The estimates presented in Column 3 suggest that there is, in fact, a 
significantly smaller effect on bilateral trade of both of these variables in the earlier period as 
compared to the later period.  But most notably, for the question of interest for us, the inclusion 
of these additional interactive regressors has a big effect on the estimated values of the 
coefficients on both the direct peg and the indirect peg.  The direct peg coefficient more than 
doubles, from 0.161 to 0.370, and the estimated increase in bilateral trade due to the presence 
of a fixed exchange rate is 45 percent.  The indirect peg coefficient increases and the estimated 
effect when the dyad represents two countries within an exchange rate system is 10.5 percent, 
with the combined coefficient of 0.10 significantly different from zero at better than the 99 
percent level of confidence.  The CPFE estimates in Column 3 also indicate a positive,  
insignificant unlinked peg effect when a dyad is not part of a broader exchange rate system and 
8.3 percent when it is in a system (the combined effect is significantly different from zero at the 
99% confidence level).  While the instability of the coefficients across the estimates presented 
in Columns 2 and 3 may make specific point estimates somewhat suspect, the broader result 
that fixed exchange rate countries trade more, and indirect pegs matter more in systems than in 
isolation, is preserved across specifications.   
We have noted the prevalence of developing industrial observations in our sample.  We 
cannot consider the effects of a system of fixed exchange rates on industrial – developing trade 
                                                 
36 The estimates that include the Bretton Woods era data in Columns 2 and 3 include coefficients on the currency 
union dummy variable that are much larger than the estimate presented in Column 1, and, therefore, are closer to 
the value reported by Glick and Rose (2002).  This difference implies that either the number of switches in the post 
1972 sample is insufficient or the country pairs that show the largest change in trade had already dissolved by 
1972 and thus do not show up as pairs that dissolve a currency union when the sample is limited. 
37 Most of the other controls are time invariant and thus, we cannot observe their impact, or changes in it, with a 
CPFE regression.  Thus we do not try to estimate the changing role of distance over time.   17
using the post Bretton Woods sample, though, since there is no broad exchange rate system 
during that time that includes both industrial and developing countries.  Therefore, we present, 
in columns 4-6, CPFE estimates that allow for possible system effects in industrial – 
developing trade (as well as in industrial – industrial trade and developing – developing trade) 
that use data spanning the Bretton Woods and later periods.  These regressions are 
disaggregated versions of the regression presented in Column 2 in Table 4.  
The Bretton Woods sample includes many more direct peg switches among industrial – 
industrial dyads than the post-Bretton Woods era.  This may be one reason that the coefficient 
on the direct peg variable is significant (and equal to 0.10) in Column 4 of Table 4, whereas it 
was insignificant and equal to 0.036 in the comparable regression in Table 3 (Column 1).  The 
effect of an indirect peg is significant and indicates an increase in trade of 12.7 percent for 
industrial – industrial dyads when both countries are part of a broader exchange rate system 
(adding the system and non-system coefficients), but there is not a similar significant effect 
outside of a system. There is evidence of significantly negative trade diversion in bilateral trade 
among industrial countries in the longer sample period when the countries are not part of a 
broader exchange rate system, but this estimate switches to a significant positive effect when 
the countries are part of a system of fixed exchange rates.  
While the longer sample period has a marked effect on the estimated effect of a direct 
peg on bilateral trade between industrial countries, a comparison of the second column in Table 
3 and the fifth column in Table 4 shows less of a distinction between the estimates on bilateral 
trade between an industrial country and a developing country though the result is now 
significant regardless of the type of clustering.  The longer sample does show, however, a 
significant effect of an indirect peg on trade for the industrial –developing dyads of 10.5 
percent outside of a system and 18.4 percent within a system.  In addition, the coefficients on 
the unlinked peg dummy variables for this set of trading relationships is significant and equal to 
0.115 outside of a system (indicating an increase in trade of 12.2 percent) and 0.201 within a 
system (indicating an increase in trade of 22.3 percent).   
The estimated effect of a direct peg on bilateral trade between two developing countries 
does not change much with different sample periods, as can be seen by comparing the third 
column in Tables 3 and sixth column in Table 4.  As with the estimates from the post-1973 
sample presented in Table 3, the estimates using the longer sample that are presented in Table 4   18
show no significant evidence that either a direct peg or an indirect peg affects bilateral trade 
among developing countries, even though there are a great many indirect peg observations in 
this sample period. There is some evidence, however, of trade diversion in the set of dyads 
involving two developing countries.  This negative result on the unlinked peg dummy is small 
and insignificant outside of a system of fixed exchange rates, but, when one or both countries is 
part of a system of fixed exchange rates, the effect of diversion is to reduce bilateral trade to 
75.8 percent of what it would otherwise be.  Since all the system observations come from the 
Bretton Woods era, this negative diversion result suggests that bilateral trade among 
developing countries that were not indirectly pegged to each other was quite low during that 
time. 
Overall, then, the results presented in Tables 2 through 4 suggest that direct pegs make 
a statistically and economically significant impact on trade flows.  Rather than divert trade, 
they seem to create trade and even increase trade amongst other countries (the exception being 
developing countries during Bretton Woods).  In addition, when the fixed exchange rate comes 
as part of a system, the indirect fixed exchange rates that result seem to increase trade as well.  
In the post Bretton Woods era, the limited number of direct pegs seem to increase world trade 
by 2-3% and the positive impact on unlinked peg pairs adds another 1-2%.  In the longer 
sample, the direct peg share of trade is higher (16%) and indirect and unlinked peg observations 
are both more prevalent and have stronger positive impacts, implying an even bigger impact on 
trade.  
It is notable that these results differ so much from those presented in other research that 
indirectly addresses the role of fixed exchange rates on trade by considering the estimated 
effect of exchange rate volatility on trade.  In fact, there is one way in which our results are 
consistent with this literature since we, too, find a quantitatively small (albeit statistically 
significant) effect of exchange rate volatility on trade.  But our results also suggest that the 
channel through which a fixed exchange rate relationship affects trade goes beyond the 
diminution of exchange rate volatility, even when controlling for country-pair fixed effects that 
may be correlated with both the level of trade and the choice of exchange rate regime.  The 
certainty of a fixed rate simply means more than reduced volatility.   
 
   19
IV. Robustness 
  This section presents results that address the robustness of the estimates presented 
above.  We begin with an investigation of the robustness of our results to the use of alternative 
exchange rate classification schemes since the identification of a peg is at the center of our 
empirical analysis.  Section IV.2 presents instrumental variables estimates that consider the 
endogeneity of the exchange rate regime. We then turn to an issue that is important for policy, 
in Section IV.3, the effect on trade of a transition from a fixed exchange rate to a flexible 
exchange rate, or from a flexible exchange rate to a fixed exchange rate.  This is followed by a 
consideration of the robustness of our estimates to the use of alternative econometric 
methodologies in Section IV.4, and Section IV.5 concludes with estimates based on subsamples 
of the data.  
IV.1  Alternate classifications 
We argue in section II.2 that using fixed exchange rate dummy variables based on the 
de facto classification of Shambaugh (2004) is a more appropriate way to test the impact of 
fixed exchange rates on trade than relying on exchange rate volatility measures.  There are, 
however, other available classification schemes, and in this section we consider results obtained 
when using two of them; the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), and a de 
jure classification based on countries’ declared exchange rate status.  The estimates obtained 
from a de facto classification different from the one used in Section III enables us to test the 
sensitivity of our results to the classification scheme.  A comparison of results obtained with 
the Shambaugh (2004) de facto classification to those obtained with a de jure classification 
addresses the important question of whether the effects on trade of declaring a fixed exchange 
rate differ from those of actually maintaining a fixed exchange rate. 
The de facto classification scheme of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) is based on the 
probability that a market-determined exchange rate remains within a band over a five year 
window.
38  This classification scheme has five categories (fourteen in the detailed taxonomy) 
which, for comparability to Shambaugh’s classification used in Section III, we collapse into 
two, the pegged category, and a non-pegged category that ranges from crawling pegs to freely 
                                                 
38 A central part of the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) system is their identification of the market-determined 
exchange rate.  They define the market-determined exchange rate as either the official exchange rate, in a unified 
exchange rate system where no black market premium exists, the parallel rate (if it is determined in a market) in a 
multiple exchange rate system, or the black-market exchange rate, when it exists.  We are grateful to Carmen 
Reinhart who makes the Reinhart Rogoff classification publicly available her website.   20
floating countries.
39  The classification is available for 143 countries in our sample for a total of 
3341 country / year observations, generating 123393 country pair year observations in our data 
set in the post Bretton Woods era (158893 total observations in the full post 1959 sample).     
The Reinhart-Rogoff classification, based on five year windows, exhibits more stability 
than the Shambaugh (2004) classification.  Combined with the smaller country coverage, in the 
post-1972 data, this leads to only 76 country pairs coded as switches, while there are 118 
switches under the Shambaugh classification.
40   One might expect, therefore, a less significant 
coefficient on the Reinhart-Rogoff direct peg dummy than on the Shambaugh direct peg 
dummy since the latter captures the possible effect on trade of year-to-year instability while, in 
the former, this instability may not alter the pegged status of a country. On the other hand, we 
might expect a more significant coefficient on the direct peg dummy based on the Reinhart – 
Rogoff classification if their market-based exchange rates better capture the relevant exchange 
rate used in international transactions than the official rate used by Shambaugh.  Thus, there is 
not a strong a priori expectation on the relative size and significance of coefficients based on 
these two de facto classification schemes.   
In addition to these two de facto classification schemes, we also use a de jure 
classification based on countries’ declared exchange rate status, as reported to the IMF and as 
published, over time, in its Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER).  We classify an exchange rate arrangement as pegged if the AREAER 
lists it as a single currency peg, as having limited flexibility to one currency, or if the country is 
in a cooperative exchange rate arrangement (like the EMS).  We classify all other AREAER 
categories, including those ranging from basket pegs to freely floating, as non-pegged.
41  We 
might expect that coefficients on direct peg dummy variables based on these de jure codes to be 
less significant than coefficients on direct peg dummy variables based on a de facto 
classification since the de jure classification is misleading at times.  For example, Brazil 
declared a peg in the 1970’s but did not maintain it, and South Korea maintained a tight peg for 
years in the 1980s and 1990s, but its government did not declare it as having a fixed exchange 
rate at that time.  In these cases, the divergence between declared exchange rate status and 
                                                 
39 Base countries are determined by declared status or by observing exchange rate behavior. 
40 This disparity in the number of switchers suggests that we use some care when comparing results based on 
regressions that employ country pair fixed effects.   
41 Base countries are determined by country’s declarations, with the exception of the EMS for which we code 
Germany as the base country.   21
actual exchange rate behavior may weaken the estimated link between identified de jure fixed 
exchange rates and trade.
42   
Table 5 shows the results using alternative classifications.  We report CFE estimates in 
odd-numbered columns, and CPFE estimates in even-numbered columns (all estimates also 
include year dummy variables).  For comparison purposes, this table includes, in Columns 3 
and 4, the results using the Shambaugh classification but with the smaller sample that is 
available when using the Reinhart-Rogoff classification.   
The estimates obtained with the Reinhart-Rogoff classification are presented in 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.  A comparison of the results in Columns 1 and 3, and in Columns 
2 and 4, shows that the coefficients on the direct peg dummy variables are very similar across 
the two classification schemes. The smaller data set has led to a slightly increased standard 
error for the Shambaugh codes, pushing it past standard confidence intervals.  Again, we note 
that this is one place where less conservative standard errors generate a statistically significant 
result.  There is a bit more of a difference in the value of the coefficient on the indirect pegs, 
but in the case of CFE (Columns 1 and 3), neither coefficient is significant and in the case of 
the CPFE (Columns 2 and 4), the confidence intervals overlap, even at relatively low levels of 
significance. Thus, overall the results are robust to using either of these two de facto exchange 
rate classification schemes.
43  Both sets of results support the contention that fixed exchange 
rates can increase trade, and the quantitative estimate of this effect is in the 15-20% range 
(based on the CPFE results), or about 30% (using the CFE estimates).
44  Both classification 
schemes estimate a negative and significant effect on trade of indirect pegs when CPFE are 
included, but this puzzling result seems to be a consequence of the smaller sample used to 
generate the results in this table since, in Table 2, the comparable coefficient, while negative, 
has a t-statistic of less than 1. 
                                                 
42 There are 112 switches in the post-1972 period for direct pegs based on this de jure classification, a number 
comparable to that of the number of switches from the Shambaugh (2004) classification used in Section III. 
43 A comparison of the results in Columns 3 and 4 to those in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 shows that restricting 
the sample size, as is necessary when using the Reinhart – Rogoff classification, tends to make the results weaker.  
44 The similarity in results is not simply a consequence of a similarity in the two de facto classifications.  In fact, 
the Reinhart-Rogoff and Shambaugh classification schemes have a substantial amount of disagreement.  For 
example, there is disagreement on the status of 19% of the country-year observations in the post-1972 sample.  In 
the subset of the country-pair observations where one or both countries are classified as having a direct peg by 
either Shambaugh or by Reinhart and Rogoff, there is disagreement on 43% of the observations.   22
As predicted above, the results obtained using the de jure classification, presented in 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 5, are much weaker than those that use either of the two de facto 
classifications.
45  The estimated effects of a de jure direct peg are both smaller than the 
respective results for either of the de facto pegs, and the coefficients on the de jure direct pegs 
are not significant.
46  This suggests that simply declaring an exchange rate peg will not generate 
an increased trade flow, rather actually maintaining it is the important thing.
 47 
While the results in Table 5 show little difference between estimates based on the two 
de facto classifications, especially as compared to the estimates obtained with the de jure 
classification, there is more divergence between the Reinhart – Rogoff classification and 
Shambaugh classification estimates when the sample is expanded to include observations from 
the Bretton Woods era.  The reason for this is that there is a greater divergence between these 
two classification schemes in the Bretton Woods era than in the subsequent period.  The 
Reinhart-Rogoff classification codes fewer fixed exchange rates than Shambaugh in the Bretton 
Woods era since extensive capital controls at that time caused more instances of a  divergence 
between official rates (used by Shambaugh) and market rates (used by Reinhart and Rogoff) 
than in the post-1972 period.  The two classification schemes also differ more often in the 
Bretton Woods era because of disagreements on the base country, with Reinhart-Rogoff using 
the UK as a base for a number of former British colonies that Shambaugh coded as having the 
US as a base.
48 
Table 6 presents estimates for each of the two de facto classification schemes using a 
sample that includes the Bretton Woods period.  As with the estimates presented in Table 4, the 
specification used in this table allows for system effects on indirect pegs and unlinked pegs.  
Estimates using the Reinhart-Rogoff classification and including country pair fixed effects are 
                                                 
45 For comparison purposes, we limit the de jure sample to the same used in columns 1-4.  In fact, de jure codes 
are available for most observations used in the full post 1972 sample.  There is very little difference between the 
results shown here and the larger sample results. 
46 It is worth noting that these results are indistinguishable from zero when one does not cluster at all and 
significant at 10% when big country clusters are used. 
47 These results might be viewed as somewhat surprising given that the Shambaugh de facto codes agree with the 
de jure codes 87% of the time, when simply examining the annual series, but this statistic masks the fact that most 
of the agreements are on nonpegs.  There are disagreements on 28% of the observations where either the 
Shambaugh de facto classification or the de jure classification reported to the IMF reports a peg. 
48 Shambaugh used information on the behavior of countries in the wake of the 1967 British devaluation to 
determine whether they were pegged to the US or to the UK.  Countries that did not change their dollar exchange 
rate when the pound devalued were judged to be pegged to the US.  It is this set of observations that appears to 
drive the difference in results between the Shambaugh and Reinhart-Rogoff classifications in the full sample.   23
presented in Column 1, and those including country fixed effects are presented in Column 2.  
Comparable estimates based on the Shambaugh classification, and using the same set of 
country pairs, are presented in Columns 3 and 4.
49  A comparison of the estimates in Columns 1 
and 3 shows that the Reinhart – Rogoff classification yields a larger coefficient on the direct 
peg dummy variable than the one obtained with the Shambaugh classification.
50  This is also 
true of the estimates that use the country fixed effects, though in this case the difference 
between the two estimates is smaller.  Thus, estimates based on the Reinhart – Rogoff 
classification support the conclusion that the direct effect of a pegged exchange rate is to 
increase trade.  Likewise, both classification systems lead one to the conclusion that an indirect 
peg, when it is part of a broader exchange rate system, significantly promotes trade.   
IV.2 Instrumental Variables Estimation 
The next concern that we address is the possible endogeneity of exchange rate regimes 
to trade.  Of course, the use of country pair fixed effects already controls for the possibility that 
there are omitted variables that affect both the level of trade between two countries and their 
choice of their exchange rate regime.  But one might argue that there are time-varying effects 
and, rather than bilateral trade responding to a change in the exchange rate regime, the 
exchange rate regime responds to an anticipated change in bilateral trade.  We address these 
concerns by undertaking estimation using instrumental variables to explore the extent that these 
issues may be affecting our results.
51   
Previous research on the effects of currency unions on trade reports results obtained 
with instrumental variables estimates that are consistent with those obtained using OLS, 
namely that currency unions increase trade and there is only a weak effect of exchange rate 
volatility on trade.  Rose (2000) uses inflation and monetary quantity variables as instruments 
and obtains results consistent with those from OLS.  Alesina, Barro, and Tenreryo (2002) use, 
as an instrument, a dummy that indicates whether two countries share a common base country 
or the probability of that two countries share a common base, and find a strong effect of 
currency unions on trade.  Tenreyro (2003) uses the same triangular approach to generating 
                                                 
49 We do not include results using the de jure classification since it is not available before 1973 in a consistent 
fashion. 
50 Even without controlling for system effects, the direct peg is large and significant in the sample that includes 
Bretton Woods era observations when using the Reinhart-Rogoff codes.  Again, the coefficient on direct peg in 
column 3 is significant at 99% with big country clusters and 95% with no clustering. 
51 Rose (2000) argues that “trade considerations seem irrelevant when a country decides whether to join or leave a 
common currency area,” and as such, IV should not be necessary.     24
instruments in her work on exchange rate volatility and finds negligent impacts of volatility.
52  
Frankel and Wei (1993) and find a negative and significant effect of exchange rate volatility on 
trade when they instrument for this regressor using the standard deviation of relative money 
supplies, but the size of this effect is smaller when using IV than when using OLS.
53  
Estevadeordal et al. (2003) raise the possibility that membership in the gold standard is more 
likely to be endogenous than the choice of the exchange rate regime in the modern era.  They 
find, however, that the bilateral trade estimates obtained with OLS are robust to estimation in 
which membership in the gold standard is instrumented by a function that includes both 
countries’ average distance from all the countries on the gold standard at the time.
54 
An appropriate instrument for our study will predict whether a country pegs its 
currency, but this variable itself will have no direct impact on trade, outside of its indirect effect 
through the channel of exchange rate regime choice.  Our construction of an instrument draws 
on the insights of Estevadeordal et al. (2003) and Tenreyro (2003), and uses information about 
whether neighboring countries peg and, if so, to whom.  We calculate, for a given pair of 
countries, country i and country j, the percentage of countries in country j’s region that are 
directly pegged with country i.  This percentage serves as our instrument.
55  Thus, we assume 
that sometimes a country will choose to peg to a base to help stabilize its exchange rate with its 
neighbors who may also have a peg.  Such a decision is not related to trade with the base, but 
through the peg, may affect trade with the base.  To employ this strategy, we calculate the 
percentage of each region pegged to each potential base.  Then, for any pair where a potential 
base is a member, the percentage of the other country’s region (excluding it) which is pegged to 
                                                 
52 Such triangular approaches require eliminating observations with the base country.  This would make examining 
direct pegs impossible.  That is not a problem with currency unions because so many currency union observations 
are the interlocking relationships of countries sharing a currency union with one base (e.g. the bilateral 
relationships among CFA countries). 
53 Tenreyro (2003) raises the possibility that the relative money supplies will be moved by factors that also affect 
trade flows.   
54 One could try to look to the determinants of exchange rate regimes literature, but unfortunately, a large number 
of the variables considered in that literature are already being used as regressors in the gravity model (GDP, per 
capita GDP), or are trade related (terms of trade, openness), or could be related to trade (capital mobility, political 
stability), or finally, are more likely outputs of exchange rate regimes rather than exogenous predictors (reserves 
level, inflation).  See Juhn and Mauro (2002) for a recent example in this literature.  In addition, Rogoff et al 
(2003) note that “it is difficult to find empirical regularities between a large set of potential determinants of regime 
choice – including standard measures of the broader policy context – and countries actual regime choices.”  (p. 25)  
This makes it even more difficult to find proper instruments, but also makes one somewhat less worried about 
reverse causation.   
55 If country j is in fact a potential base and country i is not, then the percentage of country i's region that is pegged 
to country j is used.   25
the base is used as the instrument for whether there is a direct peg.
56  A simple regression of 
direct peg on the instrument yields a positive coefficient and an R
2 of .36.  Adding in all the 
other exogenous regressors increases the R
2 to .38.   
The instrumental variable results presented in the three columns of Table 7 should be 
compared to the respective columns in Table 2.  In both tables, the estimates in the first column 
include time dummy variables, those in the second column include time dummy variables and 
country fixed effects, and those in the third column include time dummy variables and country-
pair fixed effects. A comparison of the results in Tables 2 and 7 shows that the coefficient on 
direct peg goes up when the IV regression is used.
57  In the third column, when pair fixed 
effects are used, the standard error rises enough such that the coefficient is no longer 
statistically different from zero at 95%, but it is significant at 90%.  Thus, to the extent that one 
accepts the exogeneity of the instrument, these IV regressions appear to support the core 
specifications by showing that eliminating endogeneity does not weaken our results. 
IV.3 Entry and exit of pegs 
Estimates based on coding a country as a having either a pegged exchange rate or a 
flexible exchange rate may raise concerns that some important links between the exchange rate 
regime and trade are not captured.  In particular, one concern is that an increased level of 
bilateral trade may prompt a country to institute a fixed exchange rate with its trading partner.  
In this case, the estimated link between a fixed exchange rate and bilateral trade reflects the 
influence of the latter on the former.  While we have tried to address these issues with IV 
estimation, we can also look at the dynamic patterns.  Beyond this possibility, we are also 
interested in knowing whether the effects of a change in exchange rate status on trade are 
manifest immediately, or only with time.   
We explore these issues by including four new dummy variables in the specification, 
representing the first year of a peg, the last year of a peg, the first year after abandoning a peg, 
                                                 
56 If the other countries are pegging and this choice is correlated with other measures designed to increase trade, 
and these measures are correlated with unobserved measures in the local country, then this percentage is not a 
good instrument.  We do, though, see many instances where a country has switched bases to be more like the other 
countries in the region (Ireland switching to a German base within the EMS, former British colonies in the 
Western Hemisphere switching to the US, and former Portuguese colonies switching to a French base to be more 
like their neighbors.).  In addition, a regression that includes the instrument directly in the regression with all the 
other variables and country pair and year fixed effects, the coefficient on the instrument is not statistically different 
from zero, see table 7, column 4) 
57 If one instead instruments for currency unions, the coefficient on currency unions go up as well, but the standard 
error rises to the point that the result is not statistically significant when CPFE are included.   26
and the last year before adopting a peg.  Results are reported in table 8.  The hypothesis that a 
peg is used to lock in a higher level of trade would be consistent with a finding of a positive 
coefficient on the dummy variable representing the last year before adopting a peg.  The 
hypothesis that trade is significantly different in the immediate wake of adopting or abandoning 
a peg can be tested by considering the sign and significance of the coefficients on the dummy 
variables representing the first year of a peg and the first year after a peg is abandoned, 
respectively.  In fact, however, we find that only the dummy for a last year of a peg is 
statistically significantly different from zero indicating perhaps the impending end of the peg is 
forseeable.  The fact that the other coefficients on these dummy variables are not significant 
suggests odd dynamics are not generating the results presented above.  In particular, trade is not 
higher right before a peg begins, suggesting the concerns above do not show up in the data.
58  
Also, trade in the year immediately after a peg ends is not different from any other year of 
where there is no peg, suggesting crises or messy exits do not drive our results.
59 
IV.4 Alternate Econometric Techniques 
Our central results are robust to varying the econometric methods used to obtain 
estimated effects of fixed exchange rates on trade. These results are not presented in a table, in 
order to save space, but can be summarized as follows.  First we consider using random effects 
at the country pair level instead of fixed effects.  Including random effects strengthens the 
direct peg and moves the indirect peg to a negative significant coefficient.  However, the 
Hausman specification test rejects the hypothesis that there is no systematic difference between 
the random and fixed effects coefficients suggesting that fixed effects are appropriate.  Second, 
results are largely unchanged when using data from every fifth year rather than annual data, an 
exercise undertaken in an effort to remove some of the serial correlation  Third, employing an 
AR(1) correction still results in large and significant effects of fixed exchange rates on trade, 
albeit smaller than the simple OLS results reported above.
60  Finally, we include a lagged 
                                                 
58 Because the classification only codes full year pegs as a peg, most years coded as the last year before a peg will 
also incorporate a number of months of the beginning of the peg (assuming not all pegs begin on January 1).  
Thus, we would expect the coefficient on the last year before a peg to be marginally positive, and despite that, it is 
still statistically insignificant. 
59 None of the insignificant coefficients become significant under big country clusters or even no clustering. 
60 As noted above, alternate means of handling autocorrelated errors, such as Newey-West standard errors only 
strengthen the results from those reported.  The standard errors when just one lag is included are almost identical 
to heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and as lags included approach the maximum lags of the sample, the 
errors approach the reported results using country pair clusters.   27
dependent variable to control for possible unobservable omitted variables, a strategy that seems 
to us to be less promising than the use of country pair fixed effects.  But, as it turns out, there is 
a close correspondence to the OLS results presented in Section III and those obtained with a 
lagged dependent variable.  The coefficient on direct peg is .10 and significant at 99% when a 
lagged dependent variable is included, and the coefficient on the lag is .8.  This suggests a long 
run impact of roughly .5, not far from our original OLS estimates with time controls.   
These results suggest that the estimates presented in Section III are not merely a 
reflection of spurious correlations. 
IV.5 Alternate sub-samples 
Finally, we look at two other subsets of the data, trade with base countries and non-oil 
trade.  For the former, we may worry that non-pegged trade between, say, Ivory Coast and 
Thailand is simply not a relevant comparison to the pegged observations because most of our 
pegs are to large countries.  We thus restrict our sample to trade with a country that is a base 
country (i.e. someone else pegs to this country) somewhere in the sample.  This has little effect 
on the results; the coefficient on direct peg actually goes up slightly.  We consider non-oil 
based trade because oil based trade may be atypical of other trade flows and because many oil 
exporters are pegged to the dollar and the price of oil is denominated in dollars.
61  Again, we 
find that eliminating oil exporters does not dramatically change the results.  These more limited 
samples also do not have an impact on the results when we include unlinked pegs or allow 
indirect pegs that are part of systems to have different effects. 
V Conclusion: 
Countries peg for many reasons.  Often the concern is macroeconomic stability and the 
provision of a nominal anchor.  Still, one of the presumed benefits of a fixed exchange rate is 
that it should expand trade, at least with the base country.  Empirical backing for this 
presumption, though, has proved elusive.  This paper shows that when one focuses on bilateral 
exchange rate regimes as coded from de facto performance, rather than proxying for regimes by 
using bilateral exchange rate volatility, there are statistically and economically significant 
impacts on trade from a fixed exchange rate.   
We find that with few controls pegging appears to increase trade by as much as 80%.  
These are clearly over-estimates and when more appropriate controls are included, the results 
                                                 
61 Oil exporters are defined by the World Bank as countries with more than 50% of their exports in the form of oil.   28
are 40% with country effects or 20% with country pair fixed effects.  These results seem robust 
to a variety of econometric checks, considerations of start and stop years, and alternate de facto 
classifications.  We find that indirect pegs do not appear to have strong impacts on trade unless 
they come as part of an exchange rate system, in which case they seem to have a positive 
impact on trade.  Finally, we do not see evidence of trade diversion.  Instead, pegged countries 
seem to trade more with all other countries (though the increase is smaller than with the base). 
The magnitudes, on the order of 20%, may or may not be sufficient to offset some of 
the costs of fixing the exchange rate, but they are both statistically and economically relevant.  
Countries hoping to expand trade may choose the less restrictive and permanent fixed rate as 
opposed to a currency union.  In addition, countries already pegged may have already captured 
some of the gains of increased trade that appear available from creating a currency union.  On 
the other hand, the difficulty of maintaining a peg in the face of market pressure may lead 
countries to prefer the permanent link that a currency union can provide.  Finally, we note that 
the rapid expansion of trade in the post-Bretton Woods era is even more surprising than we 
may have already thought.  Not only has trade expanded rapidly, it has done so despite the 
collapse of an exchange rate system that was fostering it.   29
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 Figure 1. 
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Guatamala, India, South Africa are “direct pegs” to the US 
Bhutan is a “direct peg” to India, Lesotho and Botswana to South Africa 
 
Guatamala, India, South Africa are “siblings” amongst themselves 
Lesotho  and  Botswana  are  “siblings”        all 
           c o n s i d e r e d    
Bhutan, Lesotho, and Botswana are “grandchildren” of the US      indirect pegs 
 
Bhutan is “cousin” with Lesotho and Botswana 
 
Bhutan to Guatamala and South Africa is an “aunt/uncle” relationship 
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Total        
Observations 213391  168868  6349  68108  94411 
# of country pairs  11857  11805  276  3569  7960 
% world trade  100%  100%  52%  38%  9% 
Direct Pegs        
Observations 2753  1562  130  1407  25 
% of world trade  16%  11%  7%  5%  0% 
# switchers  162  118  14  102  2 
Average trade / average for 
all dyads 
1151% 1253%  715%  573%  6136% 
Indirect peg # of obs.  45591  13679  332  1730  11617 
Indirect peg # of switches  5896  2357  59  315  1983 
System indirect # obs.  29669  329  329  0  0 
System indirect # switchers  4953  59  59  0  0 
Unlinked peg # of obs.  103845  94614  2075  39819  52720 
Unlinked peg # of switches  10183  6164  191  2113  3860 
Currency Unions        
Observations 3055  2055  6  193  1806 
% of world trade  2%  <0.5% <0.5% <0.5% <0.5% 
#  switchers  129  62 1  9 52 
Average trade / average for 
all dyads 
71% 35% 252%  231% 23% 
 
Note: % of trade results are the average of annual results for the relevant time sample  
 
   34
Table 2.  Core Results 
 1  2  3 
  OLS, time  CFE, time  CPFE, time 
direct peg  0.586  0.324  0.194 
 0.124**  0.145*  0.089* 
indirect  peg  -0.351 -0.031 -0.015 
 0.050**  0.04  0.028 
currency union  1.341  1.231  0.323 
 0.158**  0.155**  0.132* 
exch rt volatility  -0.262 -0.271 -0.205 
  0.046** 0.039** 0.032** 
(exch rt volatility)
2 0.007  0.007  0.006 
  0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
ldist -1.212  -1.431   
 0.025**  0.026**   
lrgdp 0.968  0.059  0.445 
 0.010**  0.066  0.061** 
lrgdppc 0.392  0.322  0.007 
 0.015**  0.063**  0.058 
comlang 0.342  0.302   
 0.046**  0.050**   
border 0.582  0.360   
 0.126**  0.123**   
regional 1.050  0.529  0.265 
  0.139** 0.163** 0.072** 
landl -0.25  -0.155   
 0.035**  0.322   
island 0.007  2.168   
 0.040  0.228**   
lareap -0.106  0.628   
 0.009**  0.045**   
comcol 0.337  0.547   
 0.073**  0.070**   
curcol 0.741  0.104  -0.032 
 0.383+  0.480  0.452 
comctry -0.511  0.472   
 0.877  0.558   
colony 1.403  1.398   
 0.120**  0.120**   
Constant  -29.862 -6.797 -11.603 
  0.390** 1.344** 2.007** 
Observations  168868 168868 168868 
R
2  0.64 0.71 0.87 
Number of country pairs FE      11805 
Impact of reducing volatility 
from mean to zero 
-1.3% -1.3% -1.0% 
+ significant at 10% * significant at 5%; ** at 1% 
standard errors clustered at country pair level    35
Table 3   Different country types 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  indind inddev devdev indind inddev devdev 
direct peg  0.036 0.137 -0.260  -0.211 0.403 0.240 
  0.055  0.100  0.140+  0.132 0.085** 0.909 
indirect peg  0.109 -0.034 0.008 -0.054 0.177 0.081 
  0.037** 0.036  0.033  0.063 0.058**  0.046+ 
currency union  -0.039 0.209 0.302 -0.359 0.590 0.967 
  0.043 0.223  0.160+  0.221 0.359  0.177** 
exch rt volatility  -3.998 -2.184 -0.158 -8.821 -2.598 -0.192 
  1.518** 0.263** 0.032** 2.908** 0.302** 0.037** 
(exch rt vol)
2  39.065 3.446  0.004 96.004 4.652  0.005 
  22.218+ 0.783** 0.001** 37.873* 0.906** 0.001** 
ldist  -0.401 0.007 0.519 -1.108 -1.412 -1.621 
  0.236+  0.092  0.095** 0.068** 0.053** 0.034** 
lrgdp  0.907 0.617 0.050 -0.516 -0.017 0.170 
  0.248** 0.090**  0.092  0.251*  0.090  0.103+ 
lrgdppc  0.280 0.225 -0.019 0.977 0.601 0.369 
  0.053** 0.19  0.137  0.260**  0.088**  0.098** 
comlang   -0.006  0.237  0.431  0.166 
   0.459   0.107*  0.060**  0.068* 
border      -0.107  -0.078  0.514 
      0.137  0.341  0.128** 
regional        0.102 2.63 1.628 
      0.075  0.227**  0.189** 
landl      4.036  -5.011  -2.489 
      0.700**  0.384**  0.366** 
island      6.956  -3.821  -2.153 
      1.073**  0.319**  0.919* 
lareap      1.287  0.272  0.473 
      0.214**  0.044**  0.056** 
comcol       0.065  0.704 
       0.214  0.082** 
curcol       0.225   
       0.483   
comctry       0.133   
       1.006   
colony      0.804  1.155  0.091 
      0.216**  0.104**  0.161 
Constant  18.147 0.167 -16.48 -8.273 12.157 -1.584 
  8.089*  3.021 3.084**  2.540**  2.512** 2.426 
R
2  0.98 0.91 0.80 0.95 0.83 0.57 
Observations  6349 68108  94411 6349 68108  94411 
Number of CPFE  276 3569  7960       
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** at 1% standard errors clustered at country pair level   
 
Note: indind is industrial only pairs.  inddev is industrial / developing pairs.  devdev is developing only pairs.   
Time fixed effects in all regressions.  Country pair fixed effects in 1-3.  Country effects in 4-6.   36
Table 4.  System Effects  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  post 72  full sample full sample ind ind  ind dev  dev dev 
direct  peg  0.205 0.161 0.370 0.100 0.183 -0.295 
 0.089*  0.064*  0.065**  0.050*  0.079*  0.314 
indirect  peg  0.029 -0.041 0.044  -0.14  0.100 -0.013 
  0.033 0.029 0.029 0.125  0.040*  0.039 
currency  union  0.361 0.758 0.599 0.877 0.681 0.458 
  0.134** 0.121** 0.116** 0.297** 0.138** 0.164** 
exch rt volatility  -0.200 -0.244 -0.234 -1.918 -2.161 -0.179 
 0.032**  0.033**  0.033**  0.768*  0.252**  0.033** 
(exch rt volatility)
2  0.005 0.007 0.006 6.920 3.232 0.005 
 0.001**  0.001**  0.001**  2.743*  0.827**  0.001** 
lrgdp  0.449 0.448 0.632 -0.112 0.645 0.698 
 0.061**  0.049**  0.048**  0.227  0.075**  0.081** 
lrgdppc  -0.001 0.184 0.006 0.873 0.154 0.027 
  0.059 0.048** 0.047 0.213**  0.076*  0.079 
regional  0.258 0.459 0.438 0.395 0.462 0.280 
 0.073**  0.068**  0.067**  0.059**  0.224*  0.126* 
curcol  -0.023 0.208 0.085 0.251 0.231   
  0.452 0.207 0.202 0.236 0.219   
unlinked  peg  0.054 0.009 0.056 -0.145 0.115 -0.040 
  0.017** 0.017 0.017**  0.039**  0.021** 0.027 
system  indirect  0.040 0.293 0.056 0.256 0.069 0.005 
 0.064  0.041**  0.042  0.135+  0.05  0.133 
system  unlinked  0.017 0.083 0.024 0.275 0.086 -0.525 
  0.020 0.023** 0.023 0.047**  0.025**  0.139** 
BW*lrgdp     -0.138     
     0.008**     
BW*lrgdppc     -0.095     
     0.015**     
Constant -11.683  -14.217  -20.291  3.406  -23.423  -23.907 
 2.008**  1.694**  1.664**  8.4  2.566**  2.725** 
Indirect + system indirect  .070 .251 .100 .116 .169 -.077 
 .056  .035**  .035**  .046*  .039**  .133 
unlinked + system unlinked  .071  .092  .080  .129  .201  -.564 
  .019  .022** .022** .032** .024** .140** 
Observations 168868  213391  213391  9318  90011  114062 
R
2   0.87  0.86  0.86  0.98  0.9  0.78 
Number  of  CPFE  11805 11857 11857  276  3569  8012 
Country pair and time fixed effects included in all regressions, therefore cannot include ldist, comlang, 
border, landl, island, lareap, comcol, comctry or colony as regressors. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
standard errors clustered at the country pair level   37
 Table 5. Results across different classifications 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
code  RR  RR  Shambaugh  Shambaugh  De Jure  De Jure 
  CFE, time  CPFE, time  CFE, time  CPFE, time  CFE, time  CPFE, time 
direct  peg  0.284 0.155 0.262 0.174 0.106 0.069 
  0.157+  0.078*  0.161 0.109 0.170 0.120 
indirect  peg  0.048 -0.121 -0.047 -0.068 -0.080 -0.148 
 0.058  0.046**  0.046  0.032*  0.047+  0.035** 
currency  union  1.371 0.174 1.354 0.195 1.335 0.156 
  0.176** 0.171 0.176** 0.167 0.176** 0.169 
exch rt volatility  -0.224 -0.188 -0.228 -0.191 -0.228 -0.191 
  0.040** 0.034** 0.040** 0.035** 0.040** 0.034** 
(exch rt vol)
2  0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 
  0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
ldist  -1.292  -1.294  -1.297  
  0.028**  0.028**  0.029**  
lrgdp  0.022 0.346 0.008 0.347 -0.001 0.329 
  0.081 0.078** 0.081 0.077** 0.081 0.078** 
lrgdppc  0.355 0.103 0.371 0.102 0.380 0.121 
  0.076** 0.074 0.076** 0.074 0.076** 0.074 
comlang  0.352  0.355  0.357  
  0.057**  0.056**  0.056**  
border  0.555  0.551  0.549  
  0.135**  0.135**  0.135**  
regional  0.137 0.344 0.144 0.333 0.153 0.350 
  0.179 0.068** 0.179 0.067** 0.179 0.068** 
landl  -3.45  -3.484  0.411  
  0.357**  0.357**   0.393   
island  -1.380  -1.419  1.892  
  0.262**  0.263**  0.251**  
lareap  0.624  0.631  0.637  
  0.054**  0.054**  0.054**  
comcol  0.605  0.605  0.604  
  0.084**  0.084**  0.084**  
curcol  0.093 0.391 0.113 0.411 0.100 0.417 
  0.524 0.125** 0.538 0.132** 0.539 0.132** 
colony  1.258  1.258  1.282  
  0.125**  0.125**  0.127**  
Constant  0.220 -8.261 0.494 -8.299 -5.947 -7.700 
  1.724 2.574** 1.727 2.568**  1.614**  2.583** 
Observations  123393 123393 123393 123393 123276 123276 
R
2  0.73 0.88 0.73 0.88 0.73 0.88 
Number of CPFE   8163  8163  8163 
+ significant at 10% * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
standard errors clustered at country pair level  
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Table 6.  System effects across classifications (full time sample) 
  1 2 3 4 
  rr rr js js 
  CPFE, time  CFE, time   CPFE, time  CFE, time 
direct  peg  0.305 0.425 0.114 0.364 
 0.068**  0.121**  0.072  0.110** 
indirect peg  0.020  0.111  -0.031  -0.069 
 0.038  0.048*  0.033  0.042+ 
currency  union  0.740 1.345 0.749 1.321 
  0.155** 0.145** 0.155** 0.147** 
exch rt volatility  -0.218  -0.263 -0.217 -0.269 
  0.035** 0.041** 0.036** 0.042** 
(exch rt volatility)
2  0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007 
  0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
unlinked  peg  0.040 -0.047 0.034 -0.052 
  0.021+ 0.027+ 0.020+ 0.025* 
system  indirect  0.218 0.142 0.220 0.203 
 0.049**  0.061*  0.045**  0.059** 
system unlinked  0.017  0.106  0  0.137 
  0.031 0.038** 0.026 0.036** 
Constant  -11.31  -8.679 -11.591 -9.036 
  1.951** 1.279** 1.953** 1.277** 
Indirect + system indirect  .238 .253 .189 .134 
  .040** .046** .037** .046** 
unlinked + system unlinked  .058  .059  .034  .085 
 .027*  .032+  .024  .031** 
Observations  158893 158893 158893 158893 
R
2    0.86 0.73 0.86 0.73 
Number of CPFE  8194  8194  
+ significant at 10% * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
standard errors clustered at country pair level  
Standard gravity controls are included as in all other tables.  The coefficients are omitted here to save space.  39
Table 7.   IV regressions  (instrument is percentage of region pegged to base) 
 1  2  3  4 





direct peg  1.436  0.656  0.495  0.179 
  0.216**  0.284* 0.288+ 0.087* 
indirect peg  -0.343  -0.027  -0.015  -0.015 
 0.050**  0.040  0.017  0.028 
currency union  1.352  1.249  0.334  0.32 
 0.157**  0.155**  0.096**  0.132* 
exch rt volatility  -0.253  -0.268 -0.204 -0.205 
 0.046**  0.039**  0.021**  0.032** 
(exch rt volatility)
2 0.007  0.007  0.006  0.006 
 0.001**  0.001**  0.001**  0.001** 
ldist -1.211  -1.43     
 0.025**  0.026**     
lrgdp 0.966  0.058  0.444  0.444 
 0.011**  0.066  0.029**  0.061** 
lrgdppc 0.389  0.322  0.008  0.008 
 0.015**  0.063**  0.027  0.058 
comlang 0.328  0.299     
 0.046**  0.050**     
border 0.577  0.358     
 0.128**  0.124**     
regional 1.031  0.523  0.265  0.265 
 0.141**  0.164**  0.055**  0.071** 
landl -0.251  -2.785     
 0.035**  0.375**     
island 0.006  -1.216     
 0.040  0.226**     
lareap -0.108  0.630     
 0.009**  0.045**     
comcol 0.340  0.548     
 0.073**  0.070**     
curcol 0.733  0.093  -0.078  -0.037 
 0.368*  0.465  0.197  0.452 
comctry -0.446  0.505     
 0.822  0.542     
colony 1.297  1.349     
 0.122**  0.129**     
% region pegged to base        0.156 
       0.147 
Constant -29.73  -0.011  -11.538  -11.567 
 0.393**  1.433  0.989**  2.008** 
Observations 168868  168868  168868  168868 
R
2   0.64  0.71  .50  0.87 
Number of CPFE      11805  11805 
+ significant at 10% * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
R
2 in column 3 is the “overall” R
2   40
 
Table 8: Controls for Dynamics 
 
  1 2 3 4 
direct  peg  0.198 0.211 0.203 0.222 
  0.094* 0.096* 0.093* 0.097* 
indirect  peg  -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 
  0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 
currency  union  0.323 0.322 0.324 0.323 
  0.132* 0.132* 0.132* 0.132* 
exch rt volatility  -0.205  -0.205 -0.205 -0.205 
  0.032** 0.032** 0.032** 0.032** 
(exch rt volatility)
2  0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
  0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
lrgdp  0.445 0.445 0.445 0.445 
  0.061** 0.061** 0.061** 0.061** 
lrgdppc  0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
  0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 
regional  0.265 0.265 0.265 0.264 
  0.072** 0.072** 0.072** 0.072** 
curcol  -0.032 -0.032 -0.033 -0.035 
  0.452 0.452 0.452 0.452 
Last year before a peg  0.036       
  0.069     
First year pegging    -0.111     
   0.073    
Last  year  pegging      -0.138 
      0.070* 
First year after a peg      0.07   
     0.053  
Constant -11.603  -11.599  -11.6  -11.599 
  2.007** 2.007** 2.007** 2.007** 
Observations  168868 168868 168868 168868 
R
2  0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 
Country pair and time fixed effects included in all regressions, therefore cannot include ldist, comlang, 
border, landl, island, lareap, comcol, comctry or colony as regressors. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
standard errors clustered at the country pair level 
 